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Abstract 
Two experiments are reported examining the impact of recipients’ mood on the process- 
ing of simple, everyday persuasive communications andon subsequent behaviour. Consis- 
tent with the general assumption that affective states may inform an individual about 
the state of its current environment, it was found that positive (as compared to neutral 
or negative) mood reduced subjects’ motivation to systematically process both content 
information and contextual cues. Specijically, Experiment I demonstrated that, in a 
field setting, the behaviour of subjects who had been put in a good mood was less 
likely to reflect differences in message content than the behaviour of neutral mood 
subjects. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings, showing that good mood 
subjects’ behaviour was uninfluenced by content as well as context information, whereas 
bad mood subjects did make use of both types of informution. Subjects’s cognitive 
responses and evaluations paralleled the behavioural data. The results are discussed 
in terms of their compatibility with contemporary models of persuasion, and their impli- 
cations for  future research on mood and persuasion and on the interplay of aflect 
and cognition in general are considered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The impact of affective states on the strategies that recipients use to process persuasive 
messages has recently received considerable research attention (see Schwarz, Bless 
and Bohner, 1991, for a review). The interest in this issue reflects that the cognitive 
processes involved in persuasion are reasonably well understood (see Eagly and 
Chaiken, in press; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a, for reviews), rendering the processing 
of persuasive communications a fruitful, and social psychologically interesting, area 
for explorations of the interplay of affect and cognition in general. In the present 
paper, we will extend previous laboratory research by investigating the impact of 
recipients’ mood states on their processing of simple persuasive communications 
in everyday life contexts. In doing so, we will contrast predictions derived from 
motivational and capacity explanations of affective influences on processing strate- 
gies. In addition, we will test rival hypotheses concerning mood effects on the use 
of non-content cues, derived from Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986a,b) ‘elaboration 
likelihood model’ (ELM) and from Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly’s (1 989) ‘heuristic- 
systematic model’ (HSM). 
Processing persuasive communications 
Contemporary models of persuasion distinguish between two general ‘modes’ of 
attitude change. On the one hand, attitude change can be the result of recipients’ 
careful and effortful evaluation of the available arguments and other useful infor- 
mation. Under these circumstances, the magnitude of change has been shown to 
be a function of the quality of the available evidence, especially message content, 
and is mediated by the valence of recipients’ cognitive responses. This has been 
termed the ‘central route’ to persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, 1986a,b) or 
‘systematic processing’ (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Chaiken et a/., 1989). On the other 
hand, attitude change may occur without extensive processing of message content. 
Recipients may totally ignore the content of a message and still form a judgment, 
merely relying on some superficial context cue, such as the communicator’s likeability 
(e.g. Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann, 1983), or using simplifying ‘rules of thumb’ 
like ‘the more arguments, the better’ (Chaiken, Axsom, Yates, Wilson, Hicks and 
Liberman, 1988). In this mode of attitude change, which has been labelled the ‘peri- 
pheral route’ to persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, l981,1986a,b) or ‘heuristic process- 
ing’ (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Chaiken et a/., 1989), attitude change has been shown 
to be largely independent of argument quality. 
Which of the two ‘routes’ or processing modes is used depends on recipients’ 
motivation and ability to process the persuasive message. If both motivation and 
ability are high, the probability of systematic processing is increased. If either motiva- 
tion or ability are low, heuristic processing may still provide an economic way of 
forming an attitude judgment. For instance, a person lacking the ability to carefully 
process message content because of external distraction, may still be able to form 
an attitude judgment on the basis of the communicator’s credibility (e.g., Kiesler 
and Mathog, 1968). 
The impact of affective states 
While current theorizing on the interplay of affect and cognition suggests several 
different ways in which recipients’ mood may influence persuasion within this general 
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framework (see Petty, Cacioppo and Kasmer, 1988; Schwarz, Bless and Bohner, 
1991, for an overview), the bulk of empirical evidence indicates that recipients’ 
affective state influences the extent to which the content of a persuasive message 
is systematically processed. Specifically, positive affect during message exposure has 
been shown to decrease systematic processing, as compared to negative or neutral 
affect. Accordingly, subjects in an elated mood are typically less persuaded by strong 
arguments, but more persuaded by weak arguments, than subjects in a neutral or 
a mildly depressed mood (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz and Strack, 1990; Bless, Mackie 
and Schwarz, 1990; Innes and Ahrens, 1991; Mackie and Worth, 1989; Worth and 
Mackie, 1987). 
Although this basic finding has been consistently replicated, different process 
assumptions have been offered to account for it, focusing either on mood-induced 
differences in recipients’ motivation or on mood-related restrictions in processing 
capacity. Mackie and Worth (1989) hypothesized that positive mood should limit 
the cognitive capacity available for message processing by priming positive thoughts 
in memory, which are supposed to be more extensive and interconnected than negative 
or neutral thoughts (cf. Isen, 1987; M a t h  and Stang 1979). Mackie and Worth 
(1989) predicted and found that offering subjects unlimited time to process a message 
increased good mood subjects’ systematic processing of message content to a level 
that no longer differed from neutral mood subjects’ processing. Under processing 
time restrictions, however, mood differences were obtained. This was interpreted 
as evidence for the mediating role of cognitive capacity in mood effects on persuasion. 
As an alternative account, it has been suggested that moods may influence indivi- 
duals’ preferred processing style, and that persons in a good mood are more likely 
to engage in simplified, heuristic processing strategies, whereas persons in a bad 
mood may spontaneously engage in more effortful and detail-oriented analytic pro- 
cessing strategies (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz and Bless, 1991; Schwarz and Bohner, 
1990; see also Fiedler, 1988, Isen, 1987, and Kuhl, 1983, for related hypotheses). 
This prediction is derived from the assumption that ‘emotions exist for the sake 
of signalling states of the world that have to be responded to, or that no longer 
need response and action’ (Frijda, 1988, p. 354). 
If so, negative feelings may inform the individual that its current situation is prob- 
lematic. They may therefore trigger processing styles that are adequate for analysing 
the problematic situation in order to determine adequate reactions. However, any 
mechanism that increases the accessibility of relevant procedural knowledge may 
also increase the likelihood that the respective procedures will be applied to other 
tasks to which they are applicable while the individual is in a negative affective 
state. Moreover, individuals in a negative state may be motivated to avoid erroneous 
decisions in a situation that is already characterized as problematic. As a result, 
a large body of literature indicates that individuals are more likely to use effortful, 
detail-oriented, analytical processing strategies spontaneously when they are put in 
a bad rather than in a good mood (see Schwarz, 1990, for a review). 
Positive affective states, on the other hand, inform the individual that its current 
environment is a safe place. Accordingly, individuals in a good mood may be more 
likely to take risks and to use simple heuristics in information processing. Moreover, 
they may have better access to a variety of different procedural knowledge, given 
that no specific procedure is activated to cope with the current situation. In combi- 
nation, this may facilitate the higher creativity that has been observed under elated 
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mood, but may inhibit the spontaneous use of effortful analytic processing strategies, 
unless they are required by other active goals. Again, a considerable body of research 
supports this assumption (see Schwarz, 1990, for a review). 
In line with a motivational rather than a capacity constraints account, research 
has shown that specific instructional sets may override mood effects on message 
processing. For example, Bless, Bohner et al. (1990, Experiment 1) observed that 
instructing good mood subjects to focus on the informational content of the message 
helped them overcome the processing deficits that were otherwise observed (for 
related findings see Innes and Ahrens, 1991). As it seems unlikely that serious capacity 
deficits could so easily be eliminated by a change in instructional set, this finding 
seems to support a motivational interpretation of mood effects on spontaneous pro- 
cessing style. 
Thus, the available evidence concerning the role of motivational or capacity 
changes is mixed. The matter is additionally complicated by the fact that both Worth 
and Mackie’s and Bless et d ’ s  manipulations are open for reinterpretations. Specifi- 
cally, subjects could have interpreted the instruction that they may spend as much 
time as they wanted to evaluate the message (Mackie and Worth, 1989, p. 29) as 
indicating that the experimenter expects a careful analysis of message content, enhanc- 
ing subjects’ motivation to process. Conversely, Bless, Bohner et al.’s (1990) instruc- 
tion to focus on message content may have reduced the required processing capacity 
by providing a clearer specification of the processing objectives. 
In the two studies to be reported below, a different approach is used to test the 
assumption that differential motivation rather than differential capacity leads to 
the observed differences in message processing. We argue that capacity restrictions 
would be highly unlikely to mediate the observed effects if the previously obtained 
findings could be replicated under conditions that require only minimal cognitive 
capacity to begin with. Therefore, both experiments make use of very short mundane 
communications, in which only one argument (or none at all) is presented. A replica- 
tion of the basic mood influence on the processing of message content under these 
conditions would suggest that changes in motivation are sufficient to produce the 
phenomenon. 
Affective states and the processing of context cues 
While the impact of recipients’ mood on the processing of message content is well- 
documented, there is only scarce evidence for mood influences on the processing 
of context information (i.e. ‘peripheral cues’ or ‘heuristic cues’ in the terminology 
of the ELM and HSM, respectively; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a, b; Chaiken, 1987; 
Chaiken et al., 1989). Current theoretical approaches to persuasion share the assump- 
tion that reliance on context cues may increase as the systematic elaboration of 
message content decreases. Within the elaboration likelihood model (ELM), a general 
‘tradeoff between argument elaboration and the operation of peripheral cues’ (Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1986a, p. 21) has been postulated. This implies that strong effects 
of context cues should only be obtained if the motivation or ability to process content 
information is low. Similarly, the ‘heuristic-systematic model of persuasion’ (HSM; 
Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989) provides for an antagonistic influence of content 
and non-content information, which has been discussed as the ‘attenuation hypothe- 
sis’ (Chaiken et al., 1989, p. 220). 
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The latter model, however, explicitly emphasizes more complex conceptualizations 
of the interplay of content and context information in persuasion. Specifically, the 
HSM holds that systematic and heuristic processing may occur simultaneously under 
certain conditions. If an individual’s motivation to process is high, heuristic cues 
may be considered as additional evidence when systematic processing alone does 
not provide sufficient information to assess the validity of a message. This may 
be due to either personal (e.g. high personal involvement) or situational factors 
(e.g. insufficient content information to form a judgment; see Chaiken et al., 1989, 
p. 226). In either case, individuals may consider the content of the message and 
context cues (e.g. the perceived reactions of others to the message) in combination 
to assess the validity of the message. 
Assuming that negative mood increases the motivation to use detail-oriented, 
effortful processing strategies, while positive mood increases the probability of simpli- 
fying processing strategies, we may derive different predictions about the impact 
of affective states on the processing of context cues, depending on a number of 
conditions. Suppose that the content of a communication is sufficient to judge its 
validity, but that reliance on context cues promises to reduce cognitive effort and 
that a relevant heuristic is easily accessible to evaluate the implications of the context 
cues (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989). Under these conditions, one should expect 
that persons in a positive mood are more likely than persons in a negative mood 
to base their judgment on the processing of these cues, at the expense of content 
elaboration. Individuals in a negative mood, on the other hand, should be more 
likely to engage in content elaboration, and may pay little attention to context cues, 
as they can evaluate the message on the basis of its content alone. 
If, however, the content of the message is not sufficient to evaluate its validity, 
persons in a negative mood may be particularly likely to attend to context cues 
as an additional source of information as they strive to evaluate the validity of 
the communication. Thus, if the content of the message seems insufficient to form 
a judgement, negative moods may actually increase the processing of non-content 
cues, as part of an exhaustive, detail-oriented processing strategy. 
Thus, if we combine the assumptions of the informative functions approach to 
affect and information processing with those of the HSM, the impact of mood on 
the processing of context cues should largely depend on two factors: First, the length 
and complexity of the persuasive message (bearing on the ‘sufficiency criterion’), 
and second, the availability of relevant heuristics. 
In two studies, Mackie and Worth (1989, Experiment 2; Worth and Mackie, 1987) 
manipulated source expertise as a context cue, independently of argument strength 
and subjects’ mood. In these studies, subjects received a short description of the 
source, pertaining to its expertise. This description was followed by a message that 
contained eight (Mackie and Worth, 1989, Experiment 2) or nine (Worth and Mackie, 
1987) arguments. In line with the ELM and the HSM’s ‘attenuation hypothesis’, 
subjects in a positive mood tended to base their attitude judgments more on the 
expertise cue than did neutral mood subjects. Although it is questionable if a relevant 
judgmental heuristic (like ‘experts can be trusted’) was easily available in these exper- 
iments (for a more detailed discussion see Schwarz et al., 1991), the results are clearly 
compatible with the reasoning that context cues may be used as a means of reducing 
cognitive effort by individuals in a positive mood if confronted with a complex 
message. 
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In Experiment 2 of the present paper, we shall, in contrast to the studies just 
described, examine mood influences on the processing of context information when 
a short message is presented, which is likely to provide insufficient information for 
subjects who are highly motivated to process systematically. As outlined above, 
it is predicted that under these circumstances, persons in a negative mood will rely 
more on context information than do persons in a positive mood. We will return 
to this issue after presenting Experiment 1, which was designed to replicate the 
basic finding that positive mood reduces the processing of message content, using 
a short and simple message. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
A field experiment was conducted that used a very simple persuasive message contain- 
ing only one strong argument or no argument at all, which was presented to subjects 
in a non-manipulated or an elated mood. Furthermore, subjects’ overt behaviour 
in response to the communication was observed instead of some judgmental measure, 
to provide a strong indicator of the message’s persuasive impact. It was hypothesized 
that the behaviour of subjects in a neutral mood would reflect differences in message 
content, indicating that these subjects did in fact process systematically, whereas 
positive mood subjects’ behaviour would be less affected by message content, replicat- 
ing the previously obtained attitude change findings with overt behaviour as the 
dependent measure. 
Method 
Subjects and procedure 
Seventy-eight adult users of a public telephone in the pedestrian area of a German 
city served as subjects. During the time allocated for the experiment, any person 
who found the phone booth empty, and thus did not have to wait in line, was 
included. The experiment was completed on two sunny summer days.’ 
Independent variables 
In order to induce positive or neutral mood, either a coin (one German mark) or 
an onion was placed near the coin slot of the phone booth, for each subject to 
find. These objects were placed in random order and in such a fashion that it was 
virtually impossible not to notice them when trying to use the telephone. All subjects 
who found a coin took possession of it, whereas only one person who found an 
onion kept it. One third of the subjects was randomly assigned to a ‘mood control’ 
condition, which served exclusively to check the effectiveness of the mood manipula- 
tion (see below). The remaining subjects were randomly assigned to the two levels 
of a message strength factor. Before they could place their phone call, subjects were 
approached by a female confederate who was unaware of the subject’s mood con- 
dition. The confederate asked for permission to advance in line and use the telephone 
’ As there is evidence for pronounced effects of weather on individuals’ mood (e.g. Schwarz and Clore, 
1983, Experiment I), care was taken to avoid changes in weather during the course of the experiment. 
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first, telling subjects in the ‘strong message’ condition that she had to contact her 
boss, who would only be in his office for another few minutes. In the ‘weak message’ 
condition, the confederate’s request was not accompanied by any reason. Thus, the 
two independent variables constitute a 2 (positive versus neutral mood) X 2 (strong 
versus weak message) factorial between-subjects design. The proportions of male 
and female subjects were about equal across conditions. 
Dependent variable 
Each subjects’ behavioural reaction was coded as either complying (1) or not comply- 
ing (0) with the confederate’s request. Only immediate positive responses were coded 
as complying; any questions or arguments provided by the subject resulted in his 
or her behaviour being coded as not complying. This was done to ensure that no 
other information exchange except for the initial request itself would provide the 
cause of potential positive reactions. 
Mood manipulation check 
Of the 26 subjects who had been assigned to the ‘mood control’ condition, 13 had 
found a coin and 13 an onion. After these subjects had finished their telephone 
call, they were approached by a male confederate who was unaware of the subject’s 
mood condition. The confederate identified himself as an associate of the local univer- 
sity, conducting a short survey on ‘life in x-town’. All subjects agreed to answer 
three short questions as part of the survey. The first of these questions was designed 
to check the effectiveness of the mood manipulation: ‘How do you feel right now, 
at this moment? - To answer, please give me a number between one and 10. One 
means “very bad” and 10 means “very good”’. The confederate read the questions 
out loud and recorded the subject’s response. 
Results 
Mood 
The manipulation check revealed a marginally significant effect on subjects’ reported 
mood of the type of object found. As expected, subjects who had found a coin 
reported feeling better ( M  = 7.5) than subjects who had found an onion (A4 = 6.0), 
t(24) = 1.52, p < 0.075, one-tailed. Although this effect may seem rather weak, it 
should be noted that these subjects had completed a telephone call in the time between 
finding the object and reporting their mood. Thus, mood differences in the experimen- 
tal conditions, in which subjects were approached by the confederate immediately 
after they had found the object, are likely to be underestimated by the procedure 
adopted here. 
Contrast analysis 
In line with the hypothesis outlined above as well as with previous results, a specific 
two-way interaction of mood and message strength was predicted. Specifically, the 
largest proportion of compliance was expected for subjects who were in a neutral 
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mood and were exposed to the strong message, the smallest proportion of compliance 
for subjects who were in a neutral mood and were exposed to the weak message. 
The two good mood conditions were expected to yield results in between these two 
extremes. 
These considerations are reflected in the theoretically specified set of contrast 
weights shown in the lower part of Table 1. The compliance data were analysed 
using contrast analysis for proportions (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1985, pp. 46-59). 
Behavioural compliance 
The proportions of subjects who complied with the confederate’s request are dis- 
played in the upper part of Table 1. Inspection of the proportions in each cell reveals 
that, as predicted, the behaviour of subjects in a neutral mood was strongly influenced 
by message content: Whereas 92 per cent complied with the strong message, this 
was true only for 39 per cent of the subjects who were presented the weak message, 
resulting in a difference of 53 per cent. For subjects in a neutral mood, the effect 
of message strength was much less pronounced, with 75 per cent and 50 per cent 
compliance for the strong and weak message, respectively, resulting in a difference 
of 25 per cent. 
Table 1. Proportion of subjects who complied with the confederate’s request as a function 
of mood and message strength (above), and contrast weights used in data analysis (below) 
Mood 
Message strength Positive Neutral 
(a) Results 
Strong 0.15 0.92 
Weak 0.50 0.39 
(12) (13) 
(14) (13) 
Strong + 1  + 3  
(b) Contrast weights 
Weak - 1  -3 
~ ~~ 
Numbers in parentheses are condition n’s. 
The planned contrast analysis yielded a highly significant result, z = 3.81 ,p < 0.005. 
Additional comparisons between the strong and weak versions of the message within 
each mood condition revealed a highly significant effect of message strength for 
subjects in a neutral mood, z = 3.50, p < 0.002, but not for subjects in a good mood, 
z = 1 . 3 7 , ~  > 0.15. 
Discussion 
In summary, the basic finding of previous laboratory studies was replicated, using 
a behavioural measure in a natural setting. More importantly, the results support 
the hypothesis that recipient’s mood influences the processing of message content 
even if the message presented is rather simple and does not require much processing 
capacity to begin with. Thus, it seems highly implausible that the observed mood 
effect was mediated by capacity deficits under positive mood. Rather, the results 
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suggest that subjects in an elated mood may have been less motivated to analyse 
the presented message in any detail, reflecting that their affective state characterized 
the situation as non-problematic (Schwarz, 1990). 
Moreover, a possible alternative explanation based on the potentially distracting 
nature of finding a coin can be ruled out. If anything, finding a coin in a telephone 
booth seems less surprising than finding an onion. Accordingly, subjects assigned 
to the neutral mood condition, who found an onion, should have been more distracted 
than subjects who found a coin, rendering a distraction-based account unlikely. 
The present experiment also demonstrates that mood influences in persuasion are 
not restricted to attitude judgments, but are also reflected in overt behaviour. If 
one considers the seemingly irrelevant nature of the mood-inducing event used in 
this study, the potential importance of this phenomenon for everyday behaviour 
should become evident. 
In the latter regard, we note that the present study bears some similarity to Langer’s 
(1978, 1989; Langer, Blank & Chanowtiz, 1978) work on the ‘mindlessness’ with 
which people engage in mundane behaviour. The behaviour of subjects in a positive 
mood might be characterized as ‘mindless’ according to Langer’s conceptualization, 
whereas subjects in a neutral mood showed more ‘mindfulness’ in processing the 
request. Whereas Langer et al. (1978) emphasized stable features of the person (e.g. 
chronically accessible scripts) or the situation (e.g. low relevance) as the principal 
determinants of mindlessness, the results of the present experiment suggest that tran- 
sient feeling states may have a similar impact. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Although the behavioural data of Experiment 1 are consistent with the ‘informative 
functions’ approach to mood effects on persuasion, no direct evidence concerning 
the mediating role of message-related thoughts could be assessed, due to the nature 
of this field experiment. Accordingly, a conceptual replication and extension of Exper- 
iment 1 was designed to provide a more stringent test of the mediating role of subjects’ 
cognitive responses. In addition, Experiment 2 tested diverging predictions derived 
from the ELM (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a,b) and the HSM (Chaiken et al., 1989) 
concerning the processing of context cues under conditions of low versus high motiva- 
tion, as outlined above. 
Method 
Overview and design 
Subjects were recruited to participate individually in two ostensibly independent 
experiments on the topics of ‘vocational aptitude’ and ‘communication’. In the alleg- 
edly ‘first study’, a positive or negative mood was induced through bogus feedback 
about the test result. While the subject was waiting for the ‘second study’ to begin, 
an interaction with a confederate was staged. The confederate asked subjects to 
donate money to a beneficial cause and supported this request with either one strong 
or one weak argument. Simultaneously, the confederate provided a salient context 
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cue that was either strong or weak, namely a list of previous donors, containing 
few or many names. 
These manipulations resulted in a 2 (good versus bad mood) x 2 (strong versus 
weak message) x 2 (strong versus weak context cue) factorial between-subjects 
design. The central dependent variables were subjects’ overt behaviour, their cognitive 
responses, evaluations of message content, and recall of features of the situation. 
Subjects and procedure 
Seventy-three students of a West German university (30 female, 43 male) were ran- 
domly assigned to conditions and run in individual sessions. Upon arrival at the 
laboratory, each subject was paid 5 German Marks for participation. The data of 
nine subjects had to be excluded from the analysis. This was due to extraneous 
factors (e.g. language problems) for four subjects, while the other five expressed 
suspicion with respect to the bogus feedback or the authenticity of the persuasive 
communication. The drop-out rate was independent of experimental conditions. The 
data of 64 subjects (25 female, 39 male) remained in the analysis, eight in each 
experimental condition. The proportion of male and female subjects was approxima- 
tely equal in all conditions. 
Mood induction 
Following procedures used by Bohner, Bless, Schwarz and Strack (1988), a good 
or bad mood was induced by giving subjects either positive or negative feedback 
about their results in an alleged ‘Vocational Aptitudes Test’. Specifically, each subject 
had to solve 10 items of the ‘Standard’ and ‘Advanced Progressive Matrices’ tests 
of intelligence (Raven, 1958, 1962)2. To enhance the importance of the task, subjects 
were informed that the test was an excellent predictor of success in academic pro- 
fessions. The average performance in student populations was said to be six correct 
solutions. The task was explained in written instructions, and an example plus solu- 
tion was provided. The experimenter made sure that the subject had understood 
the task. Then he presented each item on a card and checked the solution time 
with a stopwatch. The time limit for each item was 45 seconds. After this time, 
the subject had to mark his or her solution on a ‘solution sheet’. To warrant the 
credibility of the feedback, subjects were encouraged to check a solution for each 
item, even if they were uncertain about it. 
After completion of the task, the experimenter took the subject’s solution sheet 
to a distant table, ostensibly to check the test result. In the positive mood conditions, 
he told the subject: ‘Very good! These are eight correct solutions. This corresponds 
to the 86th percentile, which means that only 14 per cent of the students solve 
eight or more items correctly’. In the negative mood conditions, he informed the 
subject that he or she had solved only four items correctly, corresponding to the 
14th percentile. 
* The following items were administered in the same order as presented here. ‘Bad mood’ condition: 
Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) Set 11: 24, 21, 17; Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) Set E: 
12; APM Set 11: 28, 13, 16, 23, 26, 19. ‘Good mood’ condition: APM Set 11: 13, 14, 24; SPM Set E: 
9; APM Set 11: 17,23,26, 20, 16, 15. 
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Mood manipulation check 
Following the feedback, subjects answered a questionnaire related to the ‘subjective 
experience of the test situation’. The first question was designed to check the efficiency 
of the mood manipulation and read: ‘How do you feel now at this moment?’ (1 = ‘bad’; 
9 = ‘good’). The remaining questions were fillers or pertained to sociodemographic 
variables. Following completion of the questionnaire, the experimenter announced 
that the first experiment was over and asked the subject to follow him to another 
laboratory, where the second experiment would be run. Outside of the second labora- 
tory, he apologized and asked the subject to wait on a chair in the corridor because 
it would take a few more minutes to get things ready. Then he went into the laboratory, 
leaving the subject alone. 
Persuasive communication 
About 30 seconds later, the subject was approached by a female confederate, who 
was unaware of the subject’s mood condition. The confederate wore a name tag 
that identified her as a member of a (fictitious) local organization supporting disabled 
students. She also carried a clipboard and a collecting-box. She greeted the subject 
and asked if she might talk to him or her for a moment. She then explained that 
her organization was conducting a collection on the campus. 
Depending on experimental conditions, she said that the collected money would 
be used for the construction of ramps for wheelchairs at university buildings (strong 
argument) or for building a separate library for the disabled (weak argument), respec- 
tively. Pretesting had revealed a reliable difference in perceived argument strength 
for these two projects. 
While presenting her argument, the confederate showed the subject a sheet with 
the headline ‘List of Contributors’ that contained either two (weak cunsensus cue) 
or 19 names (strong consensus cue). Pretesting of the two versions of the list in 
combination with a variety of collection purposes had indicated the effectiveness 
of this cue manipulation. 
If a subject asked any questions, these were answered according to a pre-planned 
schema, which followed the general maxim not to give any additional detail infor- 
mation. After the subject had donated or had refused to do so, the confederate 
thanked, said good-bye, and left. About 1 minute later, the experimenter opened 
the door of the laboratory, apologized once again for the delay, and asked the 
subject in .  
At this point, the subject was informed that the interaction with the money collector 
had been part of ‘the second study’, and additional dependent variables were assessed. 
Dependent variables 
Behaviour As the key behavioural measure of persuasive impact, it was recorded 
if a subject donated money (1) or did not (0). In addition, the amount donated was 
registered. It should be noted that all subjects had some money at their disposal, 
as they had been paid 5 German Marks (DM) for participation in advance. Moreover, 
this money had been handed out in small coins (one coin of DM 2, two coins of 
DM 1, one coin of DM 0.50, and five coins of DM 0.10). 
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Cognitive responses Immediately after being informed that the interaction with 
the confederate was part of the study, each subject was given 3 minutes to list all 
thoughts that had come to mind during this interaction, on a sheet containing several 
boxes. Following the standard procedure proposed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986a, 
p. 38), subjects were encouraged to report any thought, even if it seemed irrelevant 
to them. Following the thought listing, subjects were asked to categorize these cogni- 
tive responses as being favourable, unfavourable, or neutral with respect to the donation 
request. 
Recall Next, each subject was asked to recall as exactly and completely as 
possible all that the confederate said, the objects that she carried, the name of her 
organization, and the purpose of the collection. 
Evaluation ofpurpose Finally, each subject had to rate the usefulness of the collec- 
tion’s purpose on a scale ranging from 1, ‘not at all useful’, to 9, ‘very useful’. 
Before leaving, subjects were probed for suspicion in an extensive post-experimen- 
tal interview. Then they were thoroughly debriefed, were given back any money 
they had donated, and were dismissed. 
Results 
Mood 
As expected, subjects who had been given negative feedback reported feeling signifi- 
cantly worse ( M  = 4.77) than subjects who had been given positive feedback 
( M =  6.53), F(1,55) = 18.76, p < 0.00053. In a 2 x 2 x 2-analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), no other significant effects emerged, all p > 0.15. Thus, we conclude 
that the mood manipulation was successful. 
Behaviour 
The percentage of donors and the mean amount donated in each condition are 
given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Proportion of donors and amount donated as a function of mood, strength of consen- 
sus cue, and argument quality 
Strength of consensus cue 
Strong Weak 
Mood Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Proportion of donors 
Strong argument 0.88 0.88 1 .oo 0.88 
Weak argument 0.75 0.88 1 .oo 0.25 
Strong argument 1.94 2.34 2.25 1.75 
Weak argument 2.16 2.61 2.30 0.50 
Amount donated 
The amount donated is given in German Marks 
A 2 X 2 x 2-ANOVA revealed that a higher proportion of subjects in a positive 
mood (M=0.91) than of subjects in a negative mood (M=0.72) contributed to 
’ One subject did not respond to the mood question 
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the collection, F(1,56) = 4.85, p < 0.04. This main effect was qualified, however, by 
a significant two-way interaction of mood and strength of the consensus cue, 
F(1,56) = 8.62, p < 0.01, and a significant three-way interaction, F(1,56) =4.85, 
p < 0.04. No other significant effects emerged, allp > 0.14. 
Separate analyses at each level of the mood factor revealed that the behaviour 
of subjects in a good mood was neither affected by variations in message content, 
nor by variations in the non-content cue, all p > 0.12. For subjects in a bad mood, 
on the other hand, both the main effects of argument strength and the consensus 
cue, as well as their interaction, reached statistical significance, t(56) = 2.59, p < 0.02, 
for each of these effects. Thus, under negative mood, the proportion of donors was 
greatly reduced when a weak argument was presented in combination with a weak 
consensus cue ( M  = 0.25), as compared to the conditions with either a strong argu- 
ment ( M  = 0.88) or a strong cue (M = 0.88). 
Although the results for the amount of money donated show a similar pattern 
(cJ: Table 2), there was only a marginally significant interaction of mood and strength 
of the consensus cue, F(1,56) = 3.50, p < 0.07, indicating that subjects in a negative 
mood tended to donate a higher amount when a strong ( M =  2.51) rather than a 
weak cue ( M  = 1.13) was presented, whereas the amount of money donated by subjects 
in a good mood was independent of variations in the consensus cue ( M ' s  = 2.05 
and 2.28 for the strong and weak cue, respectively). 
Cognitive responses 
The mean number of thoughts that subjects reported was M = 5.20. Because systema- 
tic processing of content and context of the message should be reflected in effects 
of argument strength and variations of the consensus cue on the favourability of 
cognitive responses, for each subject, a favourability measure was computed by sub- 
tracting the proportion of unfavourable thoughts from the proportion of favourable 
thoughts. The possible range of this measure is from - 1 .OO to + 1 .OO, and its means 
are given in Table 3. 
Table 3. Mean favourability of cognitive responses* as a function of mood, strength of consen- 
sus cue, and argument quality 
Mood 
Strength of consensus cue 
Strong Weak 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Strong argument 
Weak argument 
0.00 -0.21 0.10 
-0.12 -0.02 0.12 - 
0.09 
-0.43 
*Proportion of favourable minus proportion of unfavourable thoughts. Possible range goes from- 1 .OO 
to + 1 .oo. 
As can be seen in the table, the pattern of results parallels those of the behavioural 
data. A 2 x 2 x 2-ANOVA revealed a nearly significant three-way interaction, 
F(1,56) = 3.82, p < 0.06. No other effects emerged, all p > 0.12. Separate analyses 
showed that, analogous to the behavioural variables, good mood subjects' cognitive 
responses were unaffected by either argument strength or strength of the consensus 
cue, all p > 0.25, whereas for bad mood subjects, favourability of thoughts reflected 
524 G. Bohner, K. Crow, H-P. Erb and N .  Schwarz 
an interaction of argument strength and the consensus cue manipulation, t(56) = 2.31, 
p < 0.03. No other simple effects were detected, allp > 0.25. 
Recall 
Recall protocols were coded by two independent judges for accuracy of three content 
categories: the purpose of the collection, the list of contributors, and the name of 
the collecting organization. All inconsistencies were resolved by discussion. For ‘pur- 
pose’ and ‘organization’, recall could be coded 0 (‘no or incorrect recall’), l (‘partially 
correct’), or 2 (‘correct’). The agreement between judges was good, r = 0.83 and 
0.92, respectively. For ‘list’, possible scores were 0 (‘no recall’) or 1 (‘recall’); agree- 
ment between judges was perfect, r = 1 .OO. 
A 2 x 2 x 2-ANOVA indicated that subjects in a negative mood tended to recall 
the purpose of the collection better ( M  = 1.56) than did subjects in a positive mood 
( M =  1.16), F(1,56) = 3.93, p < 0.06, all other p > 0.29. Similar, but nonsignificant 
patterns emerged for the other two recall measures (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Recall for details of the situation as a function of mood 
Dependent variable 
Donation’s Name of List of 
Mood purpose organization contributors 
Positive 
Negative 
1.16 
1.56 
1.22 
1.56 
0.53 
0.63 
The possible range for the variables in the left and middle columns is 0 to 2, for the variable in the 
right column 0 to 1, with higher values indicating better recall. 
Evaluation ofpurpose 
Not surprisingly, building wheelchair ramps was rated as being more useful 
( M =  7.81) than building a separate library ( M =  6.19), F(1,55) = 9.87, p < 0.0054. 
More importantly, a marginally significant two-way interaction of mood and argu- 
ment strength emerged, F( 1,55) = 3.40, p < 0.07, indicating that subjects in a negative 
mood strongly differentiated between the strong ( M  = 8.44) and weak purpose 
( M  = 5.88), t(17.0) = 3.90, p < 0.002, whereas subjects in a positive mood did not 
(Ws = 7.19 and 6.53, respectively), t(21.1) = 0 . 8 0 , ~  >0.40.5 
One subject did not respond to the question concerning the evaluation of the collection’s purpose. 
’ Separate variance estimates were used in these simple effects t-tests because of inhomogeneity of variances. 
Two additional marginally significant two-way interactions were obtained for the evaluation of purpose: 
In the ‘weak cue’-condition, subjects tended to differentiate more between the strong and weak purpose 
(M’s = 8.38 versus 5.75) than in the ‘strong cue’-condition (M’s = 7.25 versus 6.67), F(1,55) = 3.86, 
p < 0.06). Furthermore, subjects in a good mood tended to rate any purpose as more useful when the 
weak ( M  = 7.38) rather than the strong cue ( M =  6.33) was presented, while this pattern was reversed 
for subjects in a bad mood (M’s = 6.75 versus 7.56), F(1,55) = 3.17, p < 0.09. No other effects emerged, 
a l l F <  1. 
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Correlat ional analyses 
Correlational analyses were conducted to explore the relationship of subjects’ cogni- 
tive responses and overt behaviour. As shown in Table 5 ,  behavioural measures 
of persuasion were significantly correlated with the favourability of cognitive 
responses and with the evaluation of the collection’s purpose under bad mood con- 
ditions, but not under good mood conditions. Moreover, tests of differences in the 
correlations obtained under the two mood conditions indicated that the correlations 
of both behavioural measures and the evaluation of the collection’s purpose were 
significantly higher under bad than under good mood conditions (cf. Table 5). 
Table 5. Correlations of behavioural measures with cognitive responses and evaluations of 
purpose as a function of mood 
Mood z-test for 
Positive Negative difference 
Willingness to donate 
x Favourability of cognitive responses 0.30 0.47* 0.76 
x Evaluation of collection’s purpose 0.03 0.64* 2.77* 
x Favourability of cognitive responses 0.24 0.361. 0.50 
x Evaluation of collection’s purpose -0.15 0.47* 2.521 
Amount donated 
* p  < 0.01; t p  < 0.05. All probabilities reported are two-tailed. N = 32 for each mood condition. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 provide a replication and extension of the findings 
of Experiment 1. Once more, pronounced mood effects on subjects’ overt behaviour 
were observed, following a short and uncomplicated communication. Furthermore, 
the results clearly support the notion that individuals who are in a negative mood 
may carefully evaluate both content and context information when processing a 
persuasive communication, whereas individuals in a positive mood were likely to 
remain unaffected by either message content or context cues. 
Through the analysis of subjects’ cognitive responses, evaluations, and memory 
for details, Experiment 2 also provided information about the processes that mediated 
the impact of affective state on the behavioural responses. These data suggest that 
the behaviour of individuals in a negative mood clearly depended on the favourability 
of the thoughts that came to mind during the persuasive communication, as well 
as on the perceived usefulness of the cause. In contrast, the behaviour of subjects 
in a positive mood showed only moderate or no association with cognitive responses 
or evaluations, respectively. Finally, negative mood subjects’ slightly superior recall 
of relevant details is compatible with the assumption that they paid closer attention 
to the particular aspects of the situation. 
The finding of a simultaneous impact of message content and context cues under 
negative mood, in combination with the absence of such an impact under positive 
mood, supports the assumption of the HSM that highly motivated individuals may 
‘access and scrutinize all informational input for its relevance and importance to 
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their judgment task, and integrate all useful information in forming their judgements’ 
(Chaiken et al., 1989, p. 212, italics added). 
The results cannot be accounted for adequately, however, by the ELM’S postulate 
of a ‘tradeoff between argument elaboration and the operation of peripheral cues’ 
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a, p. 21). Although the authors of the ELM point out 
that there may be instances when both arguments and peripheral cues are operative 
(e.g. Petty and Cacioppo, 1984), the model clearly predicts that any factor that 
increases elaboration likelihood, including bad mood, should enhance argument 
impact and decrease cue impact, while the reverse should be true for any factor 
decreasing elaboration likelihood, including good mood. Thus, the ELM cannot 
account for the simultaneous decrease of both argument and cue processing under 
good mood, as compared to bad mood, that was observed in Experiment 2. 
It should be noted, however, that the ELM was originally conceptualized to explain 
attitude change when a message containing numerous arguments is presented. As 
documented by a large body of research (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; Petty, Cacioppo and 
Goldman, 1981; Petty et al., 1983), under these circumstances, a ‘tradeoff between 
content and cues is more likely to be observed than under the conditions realized 
in the present study. We shall return to this issue in the general discussion. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results of the reported studies provide clear support for the notion that the 
influence of mood on the processing of persuasive communications is mediated by 
differences in processing style, as predicted by the informative functions approach 
(Schwarz, 1990). It seems highly unlikely that the observed effects are due to capacity 
differences, as the situations in these two studies required only minimal capacity 
to begin with. This does not imply, however, that capacity constraints under positive 
mood are generally implausible - they may be observed in different types of situa- 
tions, depending on the type of event that elicited affect, and on affect intensity 
(cf. Taylor, in press). The present experiments suggest, however, that motivational 
influences of mood are suficient to produce differences in information processing, 
even if rather mild mood inductions are used, as was the case in Experiment 1. 
Behavioural decisions and the impact of good mood the mediating role of scripts 
An apparent inconsistency between the findings of Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2 deserves further attention. Whereas the predicted interaction of affective state and 
argument quality was obtained in both experiments, good mood subjects in Exper- 
iment 2 were generally more likely to donate money, consistent with a large body 
of research on affect and helping behaviour (see Schaller and Cialdini (1990) for 
a review). In contrast, being in a good mood did not per se influence subjects’ willing- 
ness to let a confederate advance in line in Experiment 1. We propose that this 
reflects the impact of affective states on ‘mindless’ behaviour. 
According to Langer et al. (1978), ‘mindless’ behaviour is due to subjects’ reliance 
on overlearned scripts that are applicable to the situation at hand (Schank and 
Abelson, 1977). In general, this reliance should be more pronounced under the heuris- 
tic processing conditions elicited by elated moods. However, the specific behavioural 
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decision depends on the implications of the most accessible script. In Experiment 
2, a ‘money collection script’ may have been available to subjects, including that 
the collector explains the purpose of the collection (which is legitimate by default), 
and the target person donates a small amount. Complying to this script did not 
interfere with any of the subjects’ ongoing activities in Experiment 2, as they were 
waiting for the next experiment to begin. In Experiment 1, on the other hand, a 
‘telephone call script’ was likely to be activated before the confederate stated her 
request. Complying with the request would therefore have interfered with the ongoing 
sequence of scripted behaviour. As a result, reliance on the most accessible script 
would have opposite consequences for subjects’ reactions in the two studies: Whereas 
pursuing the activated script would lead to noncompliance in Experiment 1, the 
reverse would be true for Experiment 2. 
These conjectures are compatible with the notion that affective states serve informa- 
tive functions (Schwarz, 1990). From this point of view, it would be highly dysfunctio- 
nal to rely on overlearned scripts for persons whose negative affective state informs 
them that their current situation may be problematic. Conversely, if a positive affec- 
tive state indicates that the current situation is safe, script-guided behaviour would 
promise high efficiency. Future studies should explicitly manipulate the accessibility 
of different scripts to test the prediction that behavioural decisions are more script- 
guided under good than under bad moods. 
Anticipation of judgment as a determinant of context impact 
In contrast to the present studies, all previous experiments on mood and persuasion 
have presented written (Bless et al. 1990; Innes and Ahrens, 1991; Mackie and 
Worth, 1989; Worth and Mackie, 1987) or taped messages (Bless, Bohner et al., 
1990) in laboratory settings. Accordingly, the recipients were usually aware from 
the outset that some kind of judgment or evaluative response (though not necessarily 
about the message’s topic) may be expected from them, motivating subjects to pay 
some attention to relevant information. This may have contributed to the finding 
that individuals in a positive mood made some use of non-content information in 
order to form a judgment under conditions that confronted them with a rather com- 
plex message (Mackie and Worth, 1989; Worth and Mackie, 1987). In contrast, 
good mood subjects in the present Experiment 2, who did not anticipate that a 
decision or judgment would be required, were neither influenced by variations in 
message content nor by variations in context cues. This suggests that individuals 
in an elated mood only pay attention to context cues when currently active processing 
goals require them to do so, much as Bless et al. (1990, Experiment 1) observed 
for message content. 
Mood and the use of message content and context cues: Some conjectures 
The above considerations suggest that future research on affect and persuasion might 
benefit from a more explicit treatment of message complexity, script or schema accessi- 
bility, and expected processing objectives. We assume that persons in a positive 
mood, whose affective state informs them that their current environment is safe 
(Schwarz, 1990), are generally less motivated to pay close attention to content or 
to non-content information and to elaborate on its implications in any detail. As 
528 G. Bohner, K. Crow, H-P. Erb and N .  Schwarz 
a result, they may be neither influenced by message content nor by context cues, 
as was the case in Experiment 2. Rather, their judgments or behaviours may be 
a function of pre-existing schemata or scripts. If they do anticipate that they may 
have to form a judgment, on the other hand, they may simplify this task by relying 
on non-content cues, provided that a relevant schema is easily accessible. This 
assumption is compatible with Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986a,b) ‘peripheral route 
to persuasion’, and equivalent to the heuristic processing mode described by Chaiken 
(1980, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989). It is also in line with empirical findings (Mackie 
and Worth, 1989; Worth and Mackie, 1987). 
Finally, systematic processing of message content is only expected under elated 
moods when recipients are explicitly instructed to pay attention to the quality of 
the arguments (Bless et al., 1990, Experiment 1) or when the issue is of extreme 
importance. 
Recipients in a negative mood, on the other hand, whose affective state informs 
them that the situation may be problematic (Schwarz, 1990), are assumed to pay 
close attention to incoming information and to elaborate on its implications, choosing 
what Petty and Cacioppo (1986a,b) termed the ‘central route to persuasion’. As 
a result, their judgements and behavioural decisions reflect an impact of message 
content, independently of the expected processing objectives. If message content 
is insufficient to form a judgment, however, these subjects may turn to the implications 
of context cues in addition to message content, as suggested by the ‘sufficiency criter- 
ion’ of the HSM (Chaiken et af.,  1989). Under these circumstances, attitudejudgments 
or behavioural decisions are a function of message content and context information, 
as was observed in the bad mood conditions of Experiment 2. 
In summary, the present conjectures and findings indicate that how we feel may 
strongly influence how we react to attempts to persuade us. Extending previous 
laboratory research, the reported studies demonstrated that a complex interplay 
of recipients’ mood, message quality, and contextual cues determines persuasive suc- 
cess in everyday settings, reflecting that individuals in an elated mood are less likely 
to engage in detail-oriented systematic information processing than individuals in 
neutral or mildly depressed moods. 
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